March 24, 2016: The Beginning of the End for Daesh?

Daesh, also known as the “Islamic State,” is a very unusual kind of political entity. Notably, it has no visible foreign policy and no allies. Nor, given its behavior, does it even have the prospect of building any kind of alliance. Even the most analogous state, North Korea, has commercial and political agreements with a neighbor. And, given that the neighbor in question is China, that’s consequential. Daesh, by contrast, is in a state of extreme hostility if not actual warfare with all of its neighbors and, unlike North Korea, has no direct access to the sea.

Given that Daesh is poor, surrounded, universally reviled and with no plausible strategy to reverse these circumstances, its days as a viable political entity have been numbered since it was created.

The news today, March 24 of 2016, makes one wonder if Daesh’s end times aren’t beginning and if the final days of its state-like functions aren’t just months away.

The news today carries two key points:  1) Syrian forces have taken, or are about to retake Palmyra; and 2) Iraqi forces have begun to move toward Mosul from the south. If sustained, these two events should be very consequential and should most likely lead to quick change. “Quick” means months.

The Syrian movement is important because Assad’s regime has mostly tolerated Daesh. Assad has even traded with this bitter enemy because he sees other Sunni groups as greater immediate dangers. However, with a recent string of advances -- together with a truce – effectively holding these other opponents at bay, Damascus can now unleash a lot of power on its Islamist enemy. For the first time, Daesh will face serious pressure from the west.

At the same time, it appears the US finally considers the Iraqi army ready enough to begin a drive toward Mosul, a move that is likely to soon lead to a similar push by Iraqi Kurds from the north. Syrian Kurds, aka the YPG, will also likely attack from the north toward Raqqa.

These simultaneous advances should reveal Daesh’s core weakness:  the inability to hold static positions against any substantial opponent.

Until now, Daesh has avoided devastation from US  air power by virtue of being thinly spread out across large areas of desert and semi-desert. But, once confronted with a superior force on the ground, that strategy will no longer work. Daesh’s forces will finally need to either concentrate, in which case they’ll be devastated by air power, or else stay spread out and retreat -- fast.

The experience of Kobane is instructive in this regard. Daesh swept toward this Turkish border town, meeting only weak and scattered resistance. Once in the town, though, the Kurds regrouped and held small areas that they were able to fortify. To attack these minor redoubts, Daesh needed to concentrate its forces and did so. But this made them visible to US bombers, the more so because the local Kurds quickly became efficient at spotting targets and radioing coordinates to the pilots and drone controllers. A very similar scenario occurred not long ago in Kosovo, where Serbian forces were lightly affected by NATO’s air campaign until they had to face a small attacking army on the ground. The Serbs gathered forces in response and the resulting losses from air attacks caused Slobodan Milosevic to negotiate an almost immediate surrender.

Movement of the Syrian, Iraqi, and Kurdish forces should create a series of Kobanes, as Daesh suffers huge casualties trying to defend territory. A very likely strategy for them will be to try to take populated areas hostage, slowing the overall advance as the attackers are required to retake towns building by building.

In this circumstance, it’s likely that the various forces, but especially the Iraqi army with its US advisors, will employ a version of General Douglas MacArthur’s “island hopping” strategy in WW II. Since Daesh’s actual numbers are small, and since its troops are lightly armed, it’s probable that the advancing army will have to leave only fairly small forces behind to protect against forays from surrounded towns.

At this point we should start to see large numbers of defectors. Most of the defenders of towns and villages will be locals who have been conscripted. As many of the militants melt away toward Raqqa or Mosul, the locals will see the opportunity to seize control – a safe choice because they’ll know that Daesh can no longer send forces to retake an area.

Unfortunately, this process of peaceful takeover is not likely to affect the larger cities – the twin Daesh capitals of Raqqa and Mosul. In both places, the fanatics will probably have sufficient power to keep the local population in check. Daesh’s leaders will then threaten a massacre of all civilians unless given some kind of safe conduct. They will punctuate their demands with a last gasp wave of terror attacks in the West.

Given that these cities don’t have much in the way of food, water, medicine and other resources at hand, negotiations won’t last long.

I can’t predict the outcome of Daesh’s last stand except that it will be the final act of a long tragedy. The only possible good from all this is that, when some future group that is angry about its treatment considers options, it will reject the demand of extremists for a violent path.

Addendum (3-29-2016) The original text omitted the thought that the siege of Raqqa is likely to be more complex if both Syrian government and Free Syrian Army forces approach at the same time. It's unlikely these two groups will easily agree on who does what and more important on who gets what. In any case, I don't believe Kurdish soldiers will attempt to enter the city proper.