By Garrison
Walters and Patrick Marotta
One hundred years ago this month, people in Europe were starting
to realize that the new war ravaging the sub-continent was going to be exceptionally
violent and destructive.
The nature of the unfolding struggle shocked many, but the
fact of its appearance surprised few. The war had been widely expected for at
least a decade.
A major point of fascination about WWI has been the sense of
inevitability that built up over so many years. A good short book about the
origins is called The Long Fuse.
The nations’ motivations are especially interesting: all truly felt that they were on the
defensive, protecting their interests against challenges from others.
Thus, Germans believed that Britain, with its navy and
colonies, was preventing their country’s growth by cutting off overseas
markets. So Germany began to build a larger navy. Britain saw this as
aggressive and strengthened its navy even more.
To the east, Russia worried that Austria-Hungary was going
to take Constantinople and the Straits and cut them off from the sea. In turn, Austria-Hungary
feared that Russia would capture the straits and become a Balkan power that
would destabilize their empire by provoking Slavic nationalism.
Germany had taken Alsace-Lorraine as a buffer against French
militarism (yes, there was a time when the French were seen as aggressive).
France, the least culpable of the nations, simply wanted the provinces back.
The nations in 1914 all feared their rivals intended
conquest. In fact, none actually intended that. There were no avowedly
expansionist players like Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan.
Tragically, although the problem of mutual fear was widely
recognized, the only reaction of substance was to plan for war. Other than the
occasional treaty that bought temporary reductions of tension, no leaders actively
tried to solve the underlying problems.
World War I showed that you get what you plan for.
A reasonable worry is that the U.S. is now in the same
situation with China and Russia.
Recent Quadrennial Defense Reviews have focused on China as
a growing threat. Much attention is given to what kind of forces and bases we will
need to deal with the challenge. Military planners and many civilian leaders
seem to think some kind of major conflict with China in the not too distant
future is inevitable. The current disputes over areas of the South China Sea
are given as examples.
Similarly, as Russia digests Crimea and nibbles at Ukraine,
there is growing sentiment that we are about to return to a Cold War scenario,
one that might involve actual shooting somewhere on the eastern side of Europe.
These are legitimate worries, but do we want to repeat the
mistakes of a century ago and set ourselves drifting toward war?
China may have some bellicose generals, but its senior
leadership has been quite prudent in the past; they are smart people who know
they have much to lose in a struggle with the United States.
The situation with Russia is very different. We’re seeing
how a leader who is both internally dominant and personally mercurial can
create enormous stress and danger.
But the mutual sanctions now going into place between the EU
and Russia certainly prove economists right:
cutting trade harms both sides. In this case, it’s going to hurt Russia
especially badly and Putin will likely soon want a way out.
Certainly, our generals are doing the right thing in
anticipating conflict with China and Russia; failure to do so is foolish, not
least because weakness can encourage aggression.
But not to plan for peace is foolish.
Since all parties would obviously benefit, there’s reason to
believe we can reach strategic agreements with both China and Russia.
The people creating these agreements for the U.S. would have
to be completely non-partisan and highly credible with the public.
That means calling on the generals and admirals.
Since Vietnam, the American military has become an
extraordinary learning organization. Not only are the people exceptionally smart,
but there’s a mental agility and freedom from dogmatism that few institutions
in history have achieved. Significantly, nearly all senior officers are deeply
educated in political science, economics, history, and culture.
So let’s create an independent task force drawn from the senior
ranks, give them staff from the intelligence agencies and the State Department,
and tell them to come up with concrete strategies for resolving conflict
peacefully.
In this case, we’d really want to get what we plan for.
